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This paper investigates bond market development in Asia by exploring the determin-
ants of firms’ decisions to issue public debt in a range of Asian economies. Using a
novel database covering the period 1995 to 2007, we use comparable micro level panel
of nine countries—China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—to explore factors that promote bond issuance by
firms. We control for firm characteristics and market features such as bond market
depth and liquidity; we also consider supra-national policy initiatives to improve bond
market function. Our paper demonstrates that regional initiatives have been an
important step towards greater bond issuance by firms in Asia, mostly by fostering
market deepening and improving liquidity.
JEL classifications: E22, F32, G32.
1. Introduction
The Asian Crisis of 1997-8 was a harsh lesson for countries exposed to borrowing in
foreign currency. The crisis caused the US dollar peg to slip in many Asian
countries and liabilities such as foreign currency bank loans increased significantly
when measured in domestic currency terms. At the same time, the withdrawal of
foreign capital and the fire sale of assets caused a deterioration on the other side of
the balance sheet, with severe implications for banks and firms (Spiegel, 2012). The
result was an imbalance between domestic assets and liabilities with its roots in the
currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. These events prompted calls for
the development of financial markets, and particularly local currency bond
markets, to reduce exposure to the currency mismatch problem in the future.1
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 See Batten et al. (2012) for a discussion on foreign bond markets and financial development in Asia.
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As a result, there were a number of policy initiatives that were undertaken by the
Asian governments specifically to encourage the bond market development. Eight
Emerging Market East Asian and Pacific (EMEAP) countries co-ordinated the issue
and trading of sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds in 2003 by creating an Asian
Bond Fund (ABF) that purchased $1bn of dollar- and local currency-denominated
government bond issues via the Pan Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and the Fund
of Bond Funds (FoBF). In December 2004 this was supplemented by the Asian
Bond Fund 2 (ABF2) which invested $2bn in domestic currency-denominated
bonds issued by sovereign and quasi sovereign issues in the EMEAP countries
excluding Australia, New Zealand and Japan. A further initiative undertaken by
the ASEAN countries, with the support of the Asian Development Bank, sought to
improve the infrastructure of the bond markets through the Asian Bond Market
Initiative (ABMI), in order to create a more integrated regional market.
Have these policies worked? Figure 1 provides two different measures of bond
market development to allow us to evaluate the growth of bond markets in Asia.
The first panel shows that corporate bonds outstanding have been growing rapidly
since 1995. There was a step increase in the volumes outstanding in 2000, and an
increasing rate of expansion from that point onwards. To evaluate bond issuance
we refer to the second panel of Fig. 1. This shows that issuance of local currency
bonds did in fact follow a similar trajectory to the volumes outstanding, with a very
large jump in the early 2000s and a growing volume of issuance thereafter, with
only a brief pause in 2010.
Figure 2 compares the growth of bond markets against the growth in real activity,
measured by GDP. Taking the ratio of bond market capitalization to GDP, we can
observe whether markets grew at the same pace or faster than the real economy.
The first panel of Fig. 2 shows that the ratio increased for the region as a whole:
growth in bond market capitalization exceeded GDP growth. The initial ratio of 7%
in 1995 increased to over 34% by 2011, which is approximately a fivefold increase,
albeit from a low base. The second panel of Fig. 2 shows that the country level
experience is more diverse. Taking data at the country level we report figures for
2000 and 2011, which show that bond markets in the financial centres of Hong
Kong SAR and Singapore grew rapidly, as did Taiwan, while others grew at a more
measured pace, and bond markets in Indonesia and the Philippines actually
contracted. Compared to other emerging markets such as Latin America, Asian
bond markets are approximately three times larger on the basis of the ratio of local
currency bonds outstanding to GDP (see Eichengreen et al., 2006). Moreover, the
percentage change in total domestic bonds outstanding over the period 2000 to
2008 was 244.2 for Asia, while for all markets covered by the Bank for International
Settlements it was equal to 104.5 (see Batten et al., (2012)). In order for local bond
markets to develop there has to be a conducive environment for issuance on the
supply side and investment on the demand side. This paper seeks to determine, at
the level of the firm, the extent to which policy initiatives aimed at issuers and
investors have influenced firms’ decisions to issue corporate bonds.
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The paper is relevant to two important literatures on corporate financial devel-
opments in Asia. First, it notes that firms in Asian countries have greater
dependence on bank finance than firms in Latin America (see Burger and
Warnock, 2006, and Eichengreen et al., 2006). This literature considers why Asia
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Fig. 1 Size of Asian corporate bond markets.
p. mizen and s. tsoukas 229
 at U
niversity of N
ottingham
 on July 13, 2016
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
0
10
20
30
40
%
 o
f G
DP
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Local and foreign currency bond markets(a)
0
20
40
60
80
%
 o
f G
DP
CH HK ID KR MY PH SG TH TW
Local and foreign currency bond markets by country
2000 2011
(b)
Fig. 2 Size of Asian corporate bond markets as a percentage of GDP
Notes: Country abbreviations: CH = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; KR = Korea;
MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TW = Taiwan.
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does not have larger bond markets, focusing on macro explanations tied to size,
volatility and liquidity of the markets as a function of institutional features such as
accounting standards, law and order, bureaucracy, and corruption (see Eichengreen
and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004).2 But beyond the macro influences on bond
markets, there are studies of firm-level influences in Latin American bond
markets as summarized in Borensztein et al. (2008). We contribute to this
literature using firm-level data from Asian countries.
Second, bond markets in Asia may be small because firms do not need extensive
market finance to invest and grow: internal funds may be sufficient while they are
relatively small. Small and medium sized enterprises rely on internal funds to
finance firm-level investment (see Guariglia et al., 2011, and Song et al., 2011).
In these circumstances we could understand why firms issue relatively few
corporate bonds; but as they grow they may require bond finance. In our study
we confirm access to liquid assets has a negative effect on the probability of bond
issuance at the firm level as this literature suggests.
Despite the importance of this topic, few studies have looked at the determinants
of corporate bond issuance in Asia. Chinn and Ito (2006) explain financial devel-
opment using indicators of capital market openness, legal, institutional and
accounting improvements, and Eichengreen et al. (2006) examine the underdevel-
opment of Asian bond markets relative to Latin American bond markets, but
neither take into account firm characteristics. Girma and Shortland (2008)
evaluate economic development at the aggregate level following Beck et al.
(2001), and extend this work to analyse the influence of political factors
following Rajan and Zingales (2003), but their definition of financial development
is restricted to the ratios of private sector credit and two measures of stock markets
finance to GDP, excluding bond market finance. Studies in Borensztein et al. (2008)
focus on Latin American firm-level data to explore the determinants of bond
market participation at the firm level, but they do not extend their studies to
Asia. None of the research that we are aware of considers the impact of the
Asian bond market initiatives at the corporate level.
To study firms’ issuance behaviour in Asia, we construct a matched firm-level
regional panel of data for nine Asian countries over the period 1995–2007
comprising 43,653 annual observations on 4,868 firms. This provides us with a
unique dataset combining bond market data with firm-level information from the
balance sheet, that allows us to explore the central question using corporate infor-
mation. We examine whether market factors influenced the firm’s decision to issue
bonds by improving the financial environment following Eichengreen et al. (2006)
and Chinn and Ito (2006) since larger markets with greater liquidity are more likely
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 A recent paper by Chinn and Ito (2006) confirms that the macro features such as size, value, and
liquidity of financial markets in developed and emerging countries are closely related to institutional
features such as capital market openness, and legal, institutional, and accounting improvements.
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to encourage firms to issue bonds.3 Country dummies allow for heterogeneity
across national bond markets. Therefore we contribute to the literature in two
ways.
First, we consider the impact of the Asian Bond Funds (ABF and ABF2) and the
Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). Eichengreen et al. (2006) and Burger and
Warnock (2006) have argued that market scale was a significant impediment to the
development of the corporate bond markets in emerging economies, but these
markets have grown in scale and liquidity during our sample period. Moreover,
Spiegel (2012) notes that it would be reasonable to expect an improvement in
market liquidity between the launch of the Asian Bond Market Initiative and the
beginning of the global financial crisis. In order to separate the effects of this
regional development from the effect of regional policy initiatives, we refer to
Taiwan as a control. Taiwan saw similar development in its national bond
market, but it did not participate in the ABF, ABF2, or ABMI initiatives. A
difference-in-differences model will tease out the regional bond development and
policy influences. The results from this assessment show that there was a positive
influence on corporate bond issuance in the ABF, ABF2, or ABMI participating
countries.
Second, in order to understand the result from our difference-in-difference
model we consider how ABF, ABF2, and ABMI might have influenced firms. The
initial objective of these policies was to increase market size and liquidity, c.f.
ASEAN (2008), and this is what they have done, as Chan et al. (2011) demonstrate,
although other impediments are still to be removed. 4 Scale and liquidity have
direct effects on the probability of bond issuance since they affect costs of
entering and exiting the market, and they reduce uncertainty and thresholds for
entry. They do this by revealing more accurately the firm’s financial condition in
the market, and encourage the development of lower cost, local underwriting and
rating agencies. There is also an indirect effect from market factors to firm-specific
factors because in a world with imperfect information these influences do not
necessarily affect all firms equally, but vary with the characteristics of the firm.
There is evidence in our results that market size and liquidity have a small signifi-
cant direct and indirect effect on the probability of issuance. Since we can be quite
precise about the timing—ABF was introduced in June 2003, ABMI began
co-ordinating bond markets in 2003, and ABF2 was rolled out in June
2005—our exploration of how much influence the initiatives had on bond
issuance at the level of the firm before and after the policy began in 2003 can
help provide independent confirmation that policy increased bond issuance.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 These quantitative indicators may also proxy for the qualitative indicators such as foreign investor
participation, transparency etc that are cited in surveys of bond market development in Asia conducted
by, among others, the Asian Development Bank, but do not have sufficient time dimension to include in
a panel study such as our own.
4 These other barriers are more difficult to measure on a consistent basis for all countries over our
sample, so we refer to scale and liquidity effects.
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We conclude that regional initiatives have been an important step towards
greater bond issuance by firms in Asia, mostly by fostering market deepening
and improving liquidity. The Bank for International Settlements has suggested
that the ABMI policies in 2003 had greater impact on sovereign issuance, while
the later ABF initiatives encouraged greater investor participation (see Chan et al.,
2011). We confirm this view in our analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes Asian bond
market development over the last decade and a half. Section 3 discuses the factors
that influence the bond market participation decision. In Section 4 we describe our
data sources and characteristics. Section 5 reports our results and Section 6
concludes.
2. Asian bond markets
The Asian region has long recognized that it has relatively less developed bond
markets in Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; only
Malaysia and Korea are exceptions in this regard, but even here the scale of the
bond markets is closer to European than US levels as a percentage of GDP. The
Asian crisis underlined the vulnerability of corporations to small underdeveloped
bond markets. Larger corporations were heavily dependent on bank finance in
domestic and foreign currency and equity finance, while smaller and medium
sized enterprises were almost exclusively reliant on domestic bank loans.
Domestic banks in turn depended on short-term dollar denominated funds to
finance these domestic currency loans creating a potential currency mismatch
between assets and liabilities on their balance sheets. The crisis caused funding to
banks and corporates to fall, and small local bond markets were unable to provide a
‘spare tyre’ for firms, c.f. Borensztein et al. (2008), amplifying its real effects.
In the post-crisis period, building deep and liquid regional bond markets became
a priority for policymakers to foster the development of a more diversified and
efficient financial sector (see Gyntelberg et al., 2005). But the fact that bond markets
were separated by country, with low liquidity, limited investor participation, under-
developed infrastructure, and few intermediaries did not make this easy to achieve.
It is widely accepted that total market capitalization of between $100–200bn is
required to achieve critical mass (see McCauley and Remolona, 2004, and
Eichengreen et al., 2006); but many emerging Asian bond markets excepting
those in Korea, and more recently China, Malaysia, and Thailand, have failed to
reach this level. Until a market reaches this critical size, trading volumes remain
low, bid-ask spreads will be wider than comparable markets elsewhere (if not
constrained by market regulations as many are in Asia) and both issuers and
investors will remain few in number. It is suggested that a larger public bond
market could be a spur to corporate bond issues because market size is a critical
indicator of the viability of bond market finance for firms.
Regional governments are aware of this and have taken large strides to improve
the bond markets at the country and regional levels. Governments have (i) issued
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increasing numbers of sovereign or quasi-sovereign bonds to establish a yield curve
off which corporate bonds can be priced; (ii) improved market infrastructure to
ensure prices and volumes are recorded more quickly, and improved the settlement
process; (iii) encouraged local ratings agencies to provide information on bond
issues, reducing information asymmetry; (iv) widened investor participation in
bond markets beyond institutional investors such as private pension funds,
insurance companies, and investment trusts by lowering the bureaucratic hurdles
involved with registration and participation; (v) enhanced foreign investor partici-
pation by liberalizing the withholding taxes and reporting requirements, and
foreign entities have been encouraged to issue bonds themselves.
Perhaps the most prominent initiative has been the move towards a regional
bond market, and here there have been two major developments. First, following
discussions among the senior executives of the regional central banks the Asian
Bond Fund was launched in 2003. Initially this was a commitment by eight
Emerging Market East Asian and Pacific (EMEAP) countries to set aside $1bn of
reserve assets in a closed end fund to purchase dollar denominated Asian
government bond issues. The ABF2 initiative, launched at the end of December
2004, extended the project to local currency government bond issues through the
Pan Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF). The
investment was enlarged to $2bn per country in an open ended fund which was
accessible to private sector investors. Second, an Asian Bond Market Initiative
(ABMI) launched in 2002 under the ASEAN framework with technical support
from the Asian Development Bank. This spurred a number of initiatives to develop
regional bond markets including (i) the intention to create a robust primary and
secondary market for securities by large sovereign bond issues by Asian govern-
ments and quasi-government agencies to establish benchmarks, (ii) Asian
government financial institutions’ financing requirements intention to meet in
Asia, and (iii) a series of new ventures to create asset-backed securities markets,
bond issues by multilateral development banks and government agencies, and
bonds to fund foreign direct investment in Asian countries. Several working
groups have been established to take these forward.
A review of these developments was commissioned by the EMEAP Working
Group on Financial Markets (Chan et al., 2011). This report concluded that the
government bond market had taken considerable steps forward, in terms of market
size and liquidity, largely due to the expansion and consolidation of new issuance at
key benchmark maturities, the emergence of market making brokers in inter-dealer
markets, and the reduction of participation costs for non-resident investors.
Expansion of bond markets has varied across Asia since 2003, with the largest
growth seen in China, Malaysia and Thailand, but relatively little growth
observed in the Philippines and Indonesia. The size of the sovereign bond
markets in Malaysia and Thailand now exceeds the $100 billion threshold
thought necessary for a deep and liquid bond market, but the move to consolidate
the issues at key maturities has meant that overall size and market liquidity at those
key maturities are less closely linked.
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3. Influences on the bond market participation decision
3.1 Factors that affect a firm’s bond issuance decision
3.1.1 Firm-specific characteristics Previous literature suggests that a firm’s size has
a positive impact on access to public finance and is expected to increase the prob-
ability of a bond issue (Calomiris et al., 1995, and Datta et al., 2000). Growing firms
are also more likely to issue bonds than firms that have fewer opportunities for
expansion because they have greater demand for external funding (see Pagano et al.,
1998, and Datta et al., 2000). If there are complementarities between issuing equity
and bonds, then the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock market may
indicate the recognition that a firm receives when it issues; it may also indicate the
relationships a firm has built up with banks (see Boot and Thakor, 2000).
The financial condition of the firm is also an important determinant of access to
external finance as argued by Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984),
Rajan (1992), and Pagano et al. (1998). High leverage can be associated with an
unhealthy balance sheet and therefore firms with higher levels of debt face greater
difficulties obtaining funds on the markets, especially during recessions
(see Cantor, 1990, and Bougheas et al., 2006). Yet, some authors argue that the
probability of raising public finance increases with firms’ leverage (see Pagano et al.,
1998, Datta et al., 2000, and Dennis and Mihov, 2003) since a high rate of leverage
can be seen as an indicator of a good credit standing and high borrowing capacity
of firms. Moreover, firms with high leverage could have higher roll-over needs, and
therefore may have greater demand for additional funding from bond markets.
As with leverage, liquidity can have a positive or negative influence on the
decision to issue. Low liquidity indicates both the need to raise funds on the
demand side, and a signal of low creditworthiness, deterring creditors from
offering finance on the supply side. Hale and Santos (2008) find that firms with
more liquidity take longer to enter the public bond market due to the fact that they
have substantial internal funds, which confirms the findings of Guariglia et al.
(2011) for firms in China. Liquidity is also used by Mateut et al. (2006) to
determine whether firms resort to bank finance.
Dennis and Mihov (2003) argue that bond financing should be more viable for
firms with high profits. It is similar in many respects to cost of sales, which records
the operating costs associated with the production of goods and services. While
profits would contribute to the likelihood of bond issuance, cost of sales would
detract from it. There is evidence, however, that profitability may not have such
high importance for Asian firms as it does in the US and Europe. In the case of
China, profitability matters for private firms but not for the state-owned firms, as
the latter are still enjoying soft budget constraints (see Ding et al., 2010). To deal
with this issue we replace profitability with cash flow, measured as the sum of the
firm’s net income and depreciation over total assets, to check the robustness of our
findings.
The firm’s ability to pledge collateral for debt finance is found to be very
important in studies on debt composition (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,
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1999, and Booth et al., 2001). Assets that are more tangible, sustain more external
financing because tangibility increases the likelihood that resources can be
recaptured by creditors in case of borrower’s default.
3.1.2 Market development characteristics
Following Chinn and Ito (2006) and Eichengreen et al. (2006) we use two indicators
to assess the depth of the Asian markets: the ratio of local currency bond issues
relative to GDP and the extent of trading in the secondary market relative to the
amount of bonds outstanding. We report these indicators in successive columns
due to the fact that they are quite highly correlated with each other (the correlation
coefficient is 0.51). The size of local currency bond obligations as a percentage of
nominal GDP measures the size of the domestic markets compared to the output of
the economy, while the trading volume is a measure of bond market liquidity. Local
currency issues have risen as a percentage of GDP from 4% at the start of our
sample to between 20-25% at the end, while trading volume in the secondary
market has risen to over 100 times outstanding volume from a multiple in single
digits over the same period. Arguably the more liquid the market is the lower its
transactions costs and the less impact trades have on market price (see Jiang and
McCauley, 2004). Burger and Warnock (2007) argue that emerging economies are
able to develop local currency bond markets if they are given the opportunity to do
so, and this seems to be borne out by the market development data.5
The resulting model we employ is a probit model (c.f. Wooldridge, 2010):
PrðBONDijt ¼ 1Þ ¼ Fðj þ Xijt1þ Zjt þ ijtÞ ð1Þ
The dependent variable, BONDijt, takes a value equal to one for each firm, i,
issuing a bond in country j at time t. The function F(.) is the standardized normal
distribution. The matrix of explanatory variables, Xijt1, comprises those firm-
specific variables which are lagged one period to mitigate potential endogeneity
concerns, and Zjt refers to a market development measure for each country
discussed above. Coefficients in matrix  and scalar  are estimated and ijt is an
error term. Our model includes a number of dummies to control for common
trends, business cycle effects and industry fixed effects across industries, but of
particular interest to us are the differences across countries given the heterogeneity
across the region. These effects are measured by j and are reported in our results as
country effects.
3.2 Difference-in-differences model
To a great extent the impact of the ABF, ABF2, and the ABMI policies will be
observed through their effects on market size and liquidity, but in order to
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5 We have also experimented with the influence of measures of banking system development and health,
such as the net interest margin and the Z-score, but these variables were not statistically significant in
influencing the firm’s desire to access the bond market.
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disentangle the effects of the policy from general bond market development, we
consider the use of a control group, Taiwan, which experienced a similar trajectory
of bond market expansion but did not participate in the ABF, ABF2, and the ABMI
initiatives.6 We use the difference-in-differences estimator to determine whether
firms in the eight country group that experienced the policy treatment (treated
group) were more likely to issue bonds after the policies were implemented
compared to firms in Taiwan (control group).
The strategy analyses those firms that were non-issuers before 2003, and
examines their behaviour in the period after the policy initiatives began. Our con-
ventional difference-in-differences specification, following the seminal study by
Card and Krueger (1994), makes allowance for other sources of variation in
issuance by referring to the control group, and separates the difference in
issuance due to the policy treatment in the treated group. The impact of the
policy on the probability of bond issuance is specified as follows:
PrðBONDijt ¼ 1Þ ¼ Fðj þ Xijt1þ Zjt þ POLICYjt þ ijtÞ ð2Þ
The terms are identical to those defined in the previous sub-section and in
addition we have the term POLICYjt as an indicator that takes a value equal to
one when the country j participated in the policy initiative at time t. The estimates
are obtained using a difference-in-differences estimator. If policy had a significant
effect on issuance in bond markets we expect to find a significant difference
between the treated and untreated groups in the form of a significant coefficient
on the POLICYjt variable.
3.3 Direct and indirect effects of bond market development
We have noted how the growth in bond market size and liquidity in Asia, could
potentially influence the issuance decision of firms by lowering issuance costs.
These can be separated into direct benefits that lower the cost for all issuers
equally, as markets develop better infrastructures, and indirect benefits, which
depend on the characteristics of the participating firm. It is possible that some
firms could be in a better position to benefit from the development of bond
markets than others because they have greater size or greater creditworthiness,
for example. If a bond issuing firm had a stronger balance sheet, measured by
higher liquidity, profitability and collateral for example, it might face lower
underwriting fees, if the underwriter believes that they will be less likely to be
left with a large inventory of unsold bonds. Therefore interactions between
market size and liquidity with these variables may increase issuance. The inter-
actions indicate the degree to which larger firms, better collateralized, more
profitable firms are more likely to issue because this element of the costs of
issuing declines in a generally expanding bond market with greater liquidity.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
6 We considered also using Vietnam as an additional control but there were insufficient observations for
this to be possible.
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These effects are closely associated with policy initiatives, because the policies were
designed to improve the functioning of bond markets, and this may have
contributed to greater market size and liquidity. By looking at periods before
and after the policy initiative we can determine whether the market development
between these two periods advantaged all firms (through statistically significant
direct effects) or some firms (through statistically significant indirect effects). In
other words, we estimate the model for a pre-policy sample (1995-2002) and a
post-policy sample (2003-2007). We can also compare the size of the effects before
and after the policy and test for equality of the coefficient estimates on direct and
indirect effects. Equality of coefficients would suggest market development had no
greater effect before the policy initiative than it had afterwards, while rejection of
equality of coefficients would suggest differences between periods after the policy
was effected.
4. Data
4.1 Data description
The data for this study are drawn from several sources and cover firms in both
emerging and developed Asian economies namely China, Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
We use data for the period 1995–2007, which covers a period of major bond
market development. We use country dummies to account for the wide regional
variation in the transparency, tax treatment, and investor participation in Asian
corporate bond markets.
We use Bondware to identify all corporate bonds issued in international markets
to gather information about the issue dates, denomination, currency, and the
maturity in the bonds measured.7 We are also able to identify the type of the
coupon (i.e., zero coupon, fixed, and floating). For the purpose of our analysis
we focus on fixed rate bonds. We use Bloomberg to identify similar data for firms
that issue bonds in the domestic Asian markets. Our coverage of bond issues
therefore embraces both firms with issues in hard currencies, which are almost
exclusively US dollar denominated, and firms with local currency denominated
bonds. Although local currency issuance first started to capture the market’s
attention in the late 1990s new issues in local currency now exceed new issues in
dollars for most countries therefore it is important to consider both the local and
international currency issues in the Asian markets in order to avoid
mis-representing the scale of corporate bond issuance.
The Thomson Financial Primark database offers balance sheet and profit and loss
accounts data for firms in the East Asian region. Our initial sample includes a total
of 43,653 annual observations on 4,868 companies. We provide information on
financial accounts and ratios for Asian firms operating in all sectors of the economy
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 Our definition of corporate bonds is in line with recent studies on Asian bond markets (see Gyntelberg
et al., 2005) and includes all non-government long-term issues in a given currency.
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for the years 1995-2007.8 Finally, bond market size and liquidity indicators are
taken from the Asian Development Bank and the Statistical Bureau of Taiwan.
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we exclude companies
that did not have complete records for all explanatory variables and firm-years with
negative sales. We also require the firms have at least three consecutive time-series
observations. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude obser-
vations in the 0.5% from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression
variables. Finally, by allowing for both entry and exit, the panel has an unbalanced
structure which helps mitigate potential selection and survivor bias. Our combined
sample contains data for 546 firms in China, 442 in Hong Kong SAR, 385 in
Indonesia, 910 in Korea, 961 in Malaysia, 240 in the Philippines, 582 in
Singapore, 207 in Taiwan, and 595 in Thailand that operated between 1995 and
2007 in a variety of sectors including manufacturing, utilities, resources, services,
and financials.9
4.2 Descriptive analysis
We present correlations of the firm-specific variables used in our empirical analysis
in Table 1, where the characteristics have relatively low correlations with each other.
Most variables have correlation coefficients below 0.20, and while leverage has
higher correlations with variables such as profitability and cash flow, this correl-
ation is never above 0.40. As expected cash flow and profitability are more highly
correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.68, therefore we use these two
variables in separate regressions.
Summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis are provided
in Table 2. The figures are presented for all firms (panel A), those firms that are
issuers (panel B) and those that are non-issuers (panel C) reporting mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values, and the number of observations. We
observe that size and growth opportunities are very different for issuers and
non-issuers and the differences are statistically significant in both cases (p-values
of a test of the equality of means are 0.00 in both cases). The mean value of the log
of assets is higher for bond issuers (equal to 17.37) compared to non-issuers (equal
to 14.14). Moreover, bond issuers have higher average growth rates (10.9% versus
7.4%). Dennis and Mihov (2003) and Hale and Santos (2008) indicate that larger
firms typically have more public debt and Datta et al. (2000) find that the
likelihood of bond issues is increasing in the firm’s size and the need for external
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 We used ISIN codes in order to link bond-specific data from Bloomberg with accounting data from
Thomson Financial. In addition, the matching of the bond data from Bondware with data from
Thomson Financial was made feasible using firms’ names.
9 Our dataset includes both non-financial and financial firms because the latter are dominant issuers in
markets such as Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Singapore (see Ma et al., 2005). However, non-financial
firms constitute the vast majority in our sample. Specifically, only 8.8% of the observations in our
sample correspond to financial, insurance, or real estate firms. The results do not change in qualitative
terms if we exclude financial firms from our sample.
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funding. This finding is also consistent with the literature on Latin American bond
markets (see Borensztein et al. 2008). Finally, there are many more non-issuers
(89%) than issuers (11%) in our sample.
On the basis of mean values of many financial indicators we find that issuing
firms are significantly different from non-issuing firms. Issuers are more leveraged
and less liquid, having a leverage ratio of 37% (issuers) to 27% (non-issuers) and a
liquidity ratio of 41% (issuers) to 48% (non-issuers). This supports the notion put
forward by a number of studies (see Pagano et al., 1998, Datta et al., 2000, and
Dennis and Mihov, 2003) that highly leveraged firms are successful and have higher
borrowing capacity. In addition, since issuing firms have greater debt, and less
liquidity, they have greater incentive to access bond markets for additional
finance. We also find that bond issuers are more profitable but the difference is
at the margin of significance (p-value is 0.06). There is also a significant difference
between the collateral of issuers and non-issuers (p-value is 0.00), therefore having
more tangible assets is an advantage for bond issuance. In summary, we note that
firms’ balance sheet indicators are significantly different for issuers compared to
non-issuers, and it is possible that differences in financial health are important
determinants of the decision to issue bonds.
5. Results
5.1 Influences on the decision to issue
Table 3 reports the estimates of various models that examine the relationship
between firm-specific characteristics, market development measures and the prob-
ability that a firm will issue bonds. We report these alternatives to gauge whether
the relationship is linear (columns 1 and 3) or nonlinear (columns 5 - 11). We also
check whether our results are robust to considering the probability of bond
Table 1 Correlation matrix
SIZE GROWTH YEARS LEVER PROF CF LIQUID COLL
SIZE 1.00
GROWTH 0.03 1.00
YEARS 0.16 0.06 1.00
LEVER 0.14 0.07 0.01 1.00
PROF 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.40 1.00
CF 0.001 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.68 1.00
LIQUID 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.10 1.00
COLL 0.004 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 1.00
Notes: The Table presents correlations for firm-specific indicators. SIZE: Logarithm of total assets.
GROWTH: Growth in sales. YEARS: Number of years a firm has been listed on the stock market.
LEVER: Total debt to total assets. PROF: Earnings before interest and taxes relative to total assets.
CF: The sum of the firm’s net income and depreciation over total assets. LIQUID: Current assets
over total liabilities. COLL: Tangible assets relative to total assets.
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Table 2a Descriptive statistics-all firms
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
SIZE 14.495 4.174 0.847 24.26 28887
GROWTH 0.078 0.42 2.883 2.417 28887
YEARS 13.591 4.668 1 25 28887
LEVER 0.284 0.242 0 2.258 28887
PROF 0.035 0.141 1.041 1.223 28887
LIQUID 0.475 0.215 0.011 0.98 28887
COLL 0.025 0.059 0.021 0.587 28887
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for firm-specific indicators. SIZE: Logarithm of total
assets. GROWTH: Growth in sales. YEARS: Number of years a firm has been listed on the stock
market. LEVER: Total debt to total assets. PROF: Earnings before interest and taxes relative to total
assets. LIQUID: Current assets over total liabilities. COLL: Tangible assets relative to total assets.
Currency units are US dollars.
Table 2b Descriptive statistics-issuers
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
SIZE 17.375 3.68 2.448 24.26 3134
GROWTH 0.109 0.351 2.294 2.408 3134
YEARS 13.427 4.781 1 24 3134
LEVER 0.378 0.222 0 2.116 3134
PROF 0.035 0.122 1.035 0.889 3134
LIQUID 0.414 0.198 0.014 0.972 3134
COLL 0.029 0.06 0.021 0.587 3134
Notes: As in Table 2A.
Table 2c Descriptive statistics-non-issuers
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
SIZE 14.145 4.094 0.847 24.19 25753
GROWTH 0.074 0.427 2.883 2.417 25753
YEARS 13.611 4.653 1 25 25753
LEVER 0.272 0.242 0 2.258 25753
PROF 0.033 0.143 1.041 1.223 25753
LIQUID 0.482 0.216 0.011 0.98 25753
COLL 0.025 0.059 0.021 0.585 25753
Notes: see Table 2A.
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issuance over a three-year period (columns 7 and 8), which averages out the effects
of frequent refinancing or periodic financing for a longer duration.10 We augment
our models with market development indicators for size and trading volume
(columns 9 and 11). We report coefficient estimates from probit models in odd
numbered columns with marginal effects reported in even numbered columns.
Country dummies are reported to investigate the differences between issuance
behaviour in the national corporate bond markets; we take Korea as our
reference country.
Looking at the simplest linear model in column 1, as expected the size of the firm
has a positive impact on the probability to issue a bond, indicating that the larger is
the firm the more likely it is to issue bonds with a marginal effects of a 1% increase
in real assets resulting in a 0.04 increase in the probability that a firm will issue
bonds. This result may reflect the high fixed costs of issuing bonds that favour
larger firms, or it may be a result of the greater information asymmetry problem
that small firms face and the finding is consistent with results reported in papers
that use these arguments (see Calomiris et al., 1995, Johnson, 1997, Cantillo and
Wright, 2000, and Dennis and Mihov, 2003). Size is also found to be a key deter-
minant of a firm’s decision to issue bonds in studies of Latin American bond
markets (see Borensztein et al., 2008). Growth in sales also has a small positive
effect on the decision to issue bonds (the marginal effect is 0.008). We conclude
that there is a minimum efficient scale to overcome before bond finance is eco-
nomically feasible, and the decision to access bond markets is driven by financing
needs proxied by growth in sales. The probability of bond issuance also marginally
decreases with the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock market which
implies that bonds and stocks are substitutes. This result is in line with earlier
reported evidence in Latin American bond markets in Borensztein et al. (2008).
The financial health indicators of the firm show that creditworthiness has a role
to play in determining the probability of bond issue. The higher firms’ leverage
(LEVER) the more likely they are to issue corporate bonds. The positive effect is
economically significant since a unit increase in leverage would increase the prob-
ability of bond issuance by 0.09. Similar findings have been reported for Latin
America. The economic reason for this result involves demand and supply side
influences. On the supply side, higher leverage can be taken as a sign that firms have
been able to access debt from banks or markets in the past, perhaps in order to
realise growth opportunities or as a sign of overindebtedness. On the demand side,
the higher the leverage the higher may be the rollover needs of the firm, stimulating
issuance. In order to allow for potential nonlinear effects we re-estimate the model
in column 5 with a quadratic term in LEVER. We find that higher debt to assets has
a diminishing effect on issuance, and beyond some point further leverage reduces
the probability of issuance. There is clearly a nonlinear effect.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
10 Note that the average bond maturity in our sample is 6.07 years which is comparable with figures
reported in Batten et al. (2012) for several Asian economies.
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The same is true for liquidity. Liquidity can be a useful source of co-funding, and
may be positively associated with bond issuance since firms that intend to invest
increase liquid assets prior to issuing bonds. But it is also true that beyond some
level, firms with greater liquidity may not require additional financing through the
bond market, as suggested by Guariglia et al. (2011) and Song et al. (2011). When
we allow for non-linear influence of liquidity on issuance in column 5, we find that
liquidity has a positive effect on issuance, while the square of liquidity has a
negative effect.
Higher profitability (PROF) and collateral (COLL) are characteristics that might
be expected to have a positive influence on the decision to issue bonds. We find it
raises the probability of issue by 0.06 in column 1 and collateral increases the
issuance probability by 0.08. This is a consistent result across most columns of
Table 3, which suggests that these two variables are important for Asian firms. The
evidence in other regions reported by Borensztein et al. (2008) is mixed: two recent
studies for Latin American countries find positive and significant coefficients, while
two others find negative or insignificant coefficients.11 Given that profitability may
not have as much importance for Asian firms as it does for Western firms, we
replace it with a measure of cash flow. Our results in column 3, show that the
impact of other variables is unchanged when we include cash flow, and cash flow
itself has a significant positive effect on issuance.
In columns 1, 3 and 5 we consider the impact of our covariates on the issuance
decision in the same year, but it is conceivable that some firms may issue only
occasionally for longer periods. To check this possibility we consider whether our
covariates influence the probability of bond issuance over a three-year period in
column 7.12 Compared to the results in column 5, the sign and significance of our
variables hardly changes, although the marginal effects tend to fall, and the inter-
pretation of their effects does not change.
The specifications in columns 9 and 11 take the model used in column 5 and
allow for bond market size and market liquidity (trading volume), respectively.
Both variables are expected to increase the desirability of issuing bonds because
larger and more liquid markets reduce the costs of issue for firms, and lower the
cost of entering and exiting the market for investors. We find that a larger local
currency bond market has a small positive influence on issuance, but trading
volume does not have a significant impact.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 A negative coefficient would be consistent with the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984),
where more profitable firms seek alternative, lower cost, forms of finance rather than bond finance. In
the Latin American studies above, where the coefficient is negative, the data contain both listed and
unlisted firms, and listing has a negative effect on the probability of bond issuance. In our case all firms
are already listed and therefore have met the profitability threshold to obtain equity finance, and greater
profitability would not necessarily alter incentives based on the pecking order theory to issue equity
instead of bonds.
12 The number of observations is lower compared with the other regression models due to the con-
struction of the three-year average of the bond issuance variable.
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In all our models we have country dummies to explore the heterogeneity in our
sample compared to a reference country, Korea. We observe a distinct difference in
the probability of issue simply based on the country in which the firm is located.
For all firms in our sample, we find those located in Taiwan, Malaysia, and
Singapore are much more likely to issue compared to firms in Korea, and firms
in China, Hong Kong SAR, the Philippines, and Thailand show a more moderate
probability of issuance. Only Indonesian firms are less likely to issue than Korean
firms; Indonesia stands out as the least developed bond market. Firms in other
countries have a higher probability of issuing than Korean firms, which probably
reflects the fact that issuance in Korea is dominated by large firms, while smaller
firms are very unlikely to issue. The differences in the probabilities of issuance
between countries are not dependent on our choice of the reference country.
5.2 Difference-in-differences results
In order to separate policy influences from the general expansion of market size and
liquidity, we introduce Taiwan as a control. Taiwan experienced a similar trajectory
of bond market development as the rest of the region, but it did not participate in the
ABF, ABF2, and the ABMI initiatives. Taking the probability of issuance in the policy
initiative period for the group of countries that participated versus Taiwan, we obtain
a difference-in-differences estimate of the influence policy initiatives had on firms in
the eight country group that experienced the policy treatment. None of the firms we
examine issued bonds in the pre-policy period, some of them issued bonds in the
period after 2003. Since we have firms in countries where a policy was implemented
to encourage bond market development, and firms in Taiwan, where there was no
such policy, we can examine whether firms in the countries influenced by the ABF,
ABF2, and the ABMI initiatives where more likely to issue than firms in Taiwan, after
controlling for the firm-specific and market development influences identified in
Table 3. Our argument is that if regional bond market development were responsible
for further increases in the probability of issuance, then we would find a significant
difference in the probability of bond issuance between the two groups.
Our results in Table 4 illustrate this point. The POLICY term is a measure of the
impact of the policy treatment on the probability of issue. The results indicate that
these policies had a positive and significant effect on the probability of issue for
firms in countries that participated in ABF, ABF2, and ABMI raising the probability
of issue by 0.06 in column 1. Subsequent columns include the market development
variables measuring the scale of local currency markets and their trading volume.
The coefficient on the policy variable takes a similar magnitude (0.06–0.09). These
findings confirm that the ABF, ABF2, and the ABMI initiatives implemented from
2003 raised the probability of issuing bonds in countries that participated in the
policy compared to Taiwan, which did not participate. By way of illustration, the
scale of the increase due to policy measures is equivalent to the firm having a 1%
increase in its tangible asset to total asset ratio, or a 2.4% increase in its size, or
having a 2% increase in its profits.
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5.3 Direct and indirect effects of bond market development
By looking at periods before and after the policy initiative we can determine
whether market development advantaged all firms (through statistically significant
direct effects) or some firms (through statistically significant indirect effects).
Direct effects are measured in the same way as they were reported in Table 3,
and measure the reduction in cost of bond market participation for issuers and
investors as markets develop. Indirect effects are measured by interactions between
market liquidity and market size and the balance sheet variables of the firm used in
Table 3.
Therefore, in Table 5 we explore the impact of interactions between market
development indicators and firm-specific variables for firms that are issuers in a
Table 4 Policy effects on the decision to issue
1 2 3
POLICY 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.086***
(10.09) (10.24) (8.46)
SIZE 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.028***
(21.45) (22.40) (20.69)
GROWTH 0.003 0.001 0.003
(-1.14) (0.56) (1.31)
YEARS 0.0001 0.002*** 0.001*
(1.35) (5.18) (1.70)
LEVER 0.119*** 0.137*** 0.128***
(10.43) (11.94) (10.31)
PROF 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.038***
(4.50) (6.09) (3.97)
COLL 0.059*** 0.071*** 0.047*
(2.62) (3.12) (1.88)
LIQUID 0.003 0.025 0.008
(-0.15) (1.09) (0.30)
LEV2 0.075*** 0.085*** 0.081***
(-6.86) (7.56) (6.96)
LIQUID2 0.012 0.0001 0.025
(-0.54) (0.00) (1.01)
LCY 0.0001
(0.57)
TRVOL 0.0002***
(2.72)
Observations 28,222 28,222 24,437
Number of firms 4,066 4,066 3,954
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.12
Notes: The estimates were obtained using a difference-in-differences estimator.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a bond issuer, and
zero otherwise. POLICY takes value one if the country participated in the ABMI
and ABF initiatives, and value zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
All firm-specific variables are lagged one period. Time dummies, industry
dummies and country dummies are included in the models.
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Table 5 Market indicators
IND=LCY IND=TRVOL
Coeff. M.E. Coeff. M.E
1 2 3 4
SIZE 0.229*** 0.030 0.247*** 0.032
(12.67) (20.30)
SIZE*IND 0.002*** 0.0003 0.0001*** 0.00002
(4.96) (4.82)
GROWTH 0.064 0.008 0.062* 0.008
(1.16) (1.72)
GROWTH*IND 0.0003 0.00004 0.00007 0.000006
(0.16) (0.28)
YEARS 0.006 0.001 0.007** 0.001
(1.05) (2.01)
YEARS*IND 0.0002 0.00001 0.0001 0.00002
(1.01) (1.60)
LEVER 1.056*** 0.138 1.364*** 0.178
(5.19) (8.35)
LEVER*IND 0.040*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.001
(4.36) (2.76)
PROF 0.792*** 0.104 0.584*** 0.076
(4.21) (4.30)
PROF*IND 0.010 0.001 0.002** 0.0001
(1.54) (2.49)
LIQUID 0.004 0.001 1.027*** 0.134
(0.01) (3.67)
LIQUID*IND 0.021 0.003 0.003* 0.0004
(1.55) (1.92)
COLL 1.148*** 0.150 0.105 0.014
(3.47) (0.42)
COLL*IND 0.018 0.002 0.006*** 0.001
(1.57) (2.63)
LIQUID2 0.406** 0.053 0.733*** 0.096
(2.29) (4.67)
LEV2*IND 0.040*** 0.005 0.006** 0.001
(3.87) (2.07)
LIQUID2 0.143 0.019 1.092*** 0.143
(0.37) (3.71)
LIQUID2*IND 0.024* 0.003 0.003 0.0003
(1.67) (1.50)
IND 0.043*** 0.006 0.003*** 0.0003
(4.28) (3.42)
Observations 28,887 25,047
Number of firms 4,090 3,977
Pseudo-R2 0.19 0.20
Notes: The estimates were obtained using a probit model. Columns 2 and 4 report the marginal effects
evaluated at covariate means. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a bond
issuer, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. All firm-specific variables are lagged one
period. In columns 1 and 2 IND is a variable measuring the size of local currency bond obligations as a
percentage of nominal GDP. In columns 3 and 4 IND denotes the extent of trading in the secondary
market relative to the amount of bonds outstanding. Time dummies, industry dummies and country
dummies are included in the models.
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probit model. The results are comparable to those reported in Table 3, but they
include indirect and direct effects. Results in column 1 report the effects of market
size ðIND ¼ LCYÞ, and in column 2 reports the influence of market liquidity
ðIND ¼ TRVOLÞ. As already noted, LCY is a variable measuring market size
based on the size of local currency bond obligations as a percentage of nominal
GDP. TRVOL is a variable measuring market liquidity based on the extent of
trading in the secondary market relative to the amount of bonds outstanding.
The direct effect is measured by the coefficient on the IND term; we observe that
market size has a small direct effect on probability of issue in column 1 and market
liquidity has a small negative effect on probability of issue in column 2. The indirect
effects demonstrate that as the market increases in scale, the size of the firm
becomes marginally less important, and leverage of the firm becomes marginally
more important. As market liquidity increases, so the age of the firm and the
profitability of the firm matter marginally less. It is clear however, that these
indirect effects have very small marginal influence compared with the marginal
effects of the balance sheet variables themselves.
We reproduce the exercise in order to obtain a difference-in-differences estimate.
The main finding here is that the policy influence remains important even in a
model where we include interaction terms, and many of the same interaction terms
that had significant coefficients in Table 5 are still significant in the difference-in-
differences model.13
Next, we focus on the influence of market size and market liquidity in two
sub-periods: 1995-2002 and 2003-2007. For reasons already stated, we expect
that while policy initiatives were relatively modest in terms of size, they sent a
positive signal to bond markets, and provided many market facilitating policies
that could improve bond market function, size, and liquidity. This in turn could
have promoted the use of the corporate bond market by firms in the region.
Therefore, we explore whether direct and indirect effects of market size and
market liquidity were more pronounced after 2003. To preserve space, the results
of the sample splits are not reported—they are available in the on-line Appendix.
We do report, however, the tests of equality in Table 6.
If we find equality of coefficients, this would suggest market development
indicators had no greater effect on corporate bond issuance before the policy ini-
tiatives were implemented than afterwards, while rejection of equality of coeffi-
cients would suggest differences between periods after the policy was effected.14
We find we can reject the null of equality of coefficients across the sample splits,
when considering the direct effect, for both market size and market liquidity
models. Similarly, we find we can reject the null of equality of coefficients across
the sample splits, when considering the indirect effect, in seven out of 18 cases for
market size and for seven out of 18 cases for market liquidity. Therefore, we
..........................................................................................................................................................................
13 These results, which are not reported in the interest of space, can be found in the online Appendix.
14 Examination of the coefficient marginal effects shows there was a larger positive influence or a smaller
negative influence in the second period when coefficients were not equal.
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conclude that split sample results confirm our earlier findings by demonstrating
direct effects were significantly stronger after the policy was initiated compared to
the pre-policy period, and indirect effects were significantly stronger for roughly
half of the interactions, and equal in the others.
6. Conclusions
The degree of financial integration in Asia varies considerably across the various
national capital markets. The governments in the region have attempted to make
the development of regional bond markets a high priority, see Ma et al. (2005). This
paper has examined the determinants of bonds issuance using a novel firm-level
dataset for several emerging Asian economies. After controlling for firm-specific
characteristics and general bond market characteristics, we examine the impact of
ABMI and ABF reforms undertaken to enhance the regional bond market.
Our conclusion is that firm-specific characteristics have the most impact on the
probability of issue. This is in line with other studies that consider the influence of
firm-specific characteristics driving the decision to issue bonds in emerging Latin
American markets, for example, see Borensztein et al. (2008). We confirm that the
ability of firms to convince investors, underwriters and rating agencies that their
bond issues are viable, is a vital matter. When we explore a difference-in-differences
Table 6 Test for the equality of coefficients based on sample splits
IND=LCY IND=TRVOL
1 2
SIZE 0.52 0.00
SIZE*IND 0.00 0.00
GROWTH 0.86 0.22
GROWTH*IND 0.16 0.80
YEARS 0.26 0.10
YEARS*IND 0.74 0.07
LEVER 0.00 0.00
LEVER*IND 0.06 0.28
PROF 0.00 0.73
PROF*IND 0.38 0.29
LIQUID 0.84 0.00
LIQUID*IND 0.58 0.28
COLL 0.09 0.65
COLL*IND 0.67 0.86
LEV2 0.08 0.06
LEV2*IND 0.00 0.02
LIQUID2 0.83 0.45
LIQUID2*IND 0.56 0.85
IND 0.00 0.02
Notes: We present p-values of a test statistic where the null hypothesis is the
equality of the coefficients.
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model, controlling for these covariates and comparing the countries that par-
ticipated in the bond market development policies versus Taiwan, we still find a
positive and significant policy effect. This proves to be very robust, suggesting the
policy did have a significant effect on firms’ decisions to issue bonds. A further
analysis of direct versus indirect effects of market development before and after the
policy was carried out also confirms this view, since we reject the null hypothesis of
equality of coefficients for direct effects and roughly half of the interactions
measuring indirect effects.
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